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ABSTRACT
The plethora of currency crises around the world has fueled many theories on the causes of
speculative attacks. The first-generation models focus on fiscal problems. The second-generation
models emphasize countercyclical policies and self-fulfilling crises. In the 1990s, models pinpoint
to financial excesses. With the crisis of Argentina in 2001, models of sovereign default have become
popular again. While the theoretical literature has emphasized variety, the empirical literature has
supported the "one size fits all" models. This paper contributes to the empirical literature by
assessing whether the crises of the last thirty years are of different varieties. Crises are found to be
of six varieties. Four of those varieties are associated with domestic economic fragility. But crises
can also be provoked by just adverse world market conditions, such as the reversal of international
capital flows. The so-called sudden-stop phenomenon identifies the fifth variety of crises. Finally,
a small number of crises occur in economies with immaculate fundamentals but this type of crises









The plethora of financial crises that have ravaged emerging markets and mature 
economies since the 1970s has triggered a variety of theories on the causes of speculative 
attacks.  Models are even catalogued into three generations.  The first-generation models focus 
on the fiscal and monetary causes of crises.  These models were mostly developed to explain the 
crises in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.  The second-generation models aim at 
explaining the EMS crises of the early 1990s.  Here the focus is mostly on the effects of 
countercyclical policies in mature economies and on self-fulfilling crises, with rumors unrelated 
to market fundamentals at the core of the crises.  The next wave of currency crises, the Tequila 
crisis in 1994 and the so-called Asian Flu in 1997, fueled a new variety of models –also known 
as third-generation models, which focus on moral hazard and imperfect information.  The 
emphasis here has been on “excessive” booms and busts in international lending and asset price 
bubbles.  With t he crisis in Argentina in 2001, academics and economists at international 
institutions are now dusting off the articles of the 1980s modeling crises of default. 
The abundance of theoretical models has failed to generate the same variety of empirical 
models.  Most of the previous empirical research groups together indicators capturing fiscal and 
monetary imbalances, economic slowdown, and the so-called over-borrowing syndrome to 
predict crises.
1    While this research has certainly helped to capture the economic fragility at the 
onset of crises and therefore to predict balance of payment problems, it has failed to identify the 
changing nature of crises and to predict those crises that do not fit a particular mold.  This paper 
contributes to this literature by assessing whether the crises of the last thirty years are of different 
varieties.  As a by-product, this paper contributes to the early warning literature by providing 
new forecasts of the onset of financial crises.   
To identify the various classes of crises, I examine crisis episodes for twenty industrial 
and developing countries.  The former include: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.  
The latter focus on: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The period covered 
starts in January 1970 and includes crises up to February 2002, with a total of ninety-six 
currency crises.  To gauge whether crises are all of the same nature or whether groups of crises 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Berg and Patillo (1999), Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), Frankel and Rose (1999), 
Kaminsky (1998), and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996).   2
show unique features, I use a variety of macroeconomic and financial indicators suggested by the 
previous literature –totaling eighteen variables– and a multiple-regime variant of the signals 
approach.
2  Once crises are classified, I examine whether the nature of crises varies across 
emerging and mature economies and tally the degree of severity of each type of crisis.   
The key finding is that, in fact, crises have not been created equal. Crises are found to be 
of six varieties.  Four of those v arieties are associated with domestic economic fragility, with 
vulnerabilities related to current account deterioration, fiscal imbalances, financial excesses, or 
foreign debt unsustainability.    But crises can also be provoked by just adverse world market 
conditions, such as the reversal of international capital flows.  The so-called sudden-stop 
phenomenon identifies the fifth variety of crises.  Finally, as emphasized by the second-
generation models, crises also happen in economies with immaculate fundamentals.  Thus, the 
last variety of crises is labeled self-fulfilling crises.   
The second finding is that crises in emerging markets are of a different nature than those 
in mature markets.  Crises triggered exclusively by adverse shocks in international capital 
markets and crises in economies with immaculate fundamentals are found to be a mature-market 
phenomenon.  In contrast, crises in emerging economies are triggered by multiple vulnerabilities.   
The last finding concerns the degree of severity of crises. As it is conventional in the 
literature, severity is measured by output losses following the crises, the magnitude of the reserve 
losses of the central bank, and the depreciation of the domestic currency.  I also estimate a 
variety of measures capturing the extent of borrowing constraints/lack of access to international 
capital markets following crises.  Notably, the degree of severity of crises is closely linked to the 
type of crises, with crises of financial excesses scoring worst in this respect. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the literature on crises 
and examines the particular symptoms associated with each model.  Section III examines the 
multiple-regime signals approach.  Section IV is the main part of the paper and examines the 
characteristics of crises in the twenty countries in the sample.  The section pays particular 
attention to the types of crises that have afflicted mature and emerging markets.  It also tallies the 
severity of the various classes of crises.  Section V examines the early warnings of crises implicit 
in this approach.  Section VI concludes. 
                                                 
2 See Kaminsky (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for an application of the one-regime signals approach to 
forecasting crises.   3
 
II. Models of Currency Crises  
 
The earlier models of balance of payments problems were inspired by the Latin American 
style of currency crises of the late 1960s and early 1970s.  In these models, unsustainable money-
financed fiscal deficits lead to a persistent loss of international reserves and ultimately ignite a 
currency crash (See, for example, Krugman, 1979 and Lahiri and Végh, 2003).  Stimulated by 
the EMS collapses in 1992 and 1993, more recent models of currency crises have stressed that 
the depletion of international reserves might not be at the root of currency crises.   Instead, these 
models focus on government officials’ concern on, for example, unemployment.  Governments 
are modeled facing two often conflicting targets: reducing inflation and keeping economic 
activity close to a given target.  Fixed exchange rates may help in achieving the first goal but at 
the cost of a loss of competitiveness and a recession.  With sticky prices, devaluations restore 
competitiveness and help in the elimination of unemployment, thus prompting the authorities to 
abandon the peg during recessions.
3  
The crises in Latin America in the 1980s, the Nordic countries in 1992, Mexico in 1994, 
and Asia in 1997 have prompted the economics profession to model the effects of banking 
problems on balance-of-payments difficulties.  For example, Diaz Alejandro (1985) and Velasco 
(1987) model difficulties in the banking sector as giving rise to a balance-of-payments crisis, 
arguing that if central banks finance the bail-out of troubled financial institutions by printing 
money, we have the classical story of a currency crash prompted by excessive money creation.  
Within the same theme, McKinnon and Pill (1994) examine the role of capital flows in an 
economy with an unregulated banking sector with deposit insurance and moral hazard problems 
of the banks.  Capital inflows in such an environment can lead to over-lending cycles with 
consumption booms and exaggerated current account deficits.  Most of the times, the over-
lending cycles are also accompanied by booms in the stock and real estate markets.  In turn, the 
over-borrowing cycles lead to real exchange rate appreciations, losses of competitiveness, and 
slowdowns in growth.  As the economy enters a recession, the excess lending during the boom 
makes banks more prone to a crisis when a recession unfolds.  This state of business becomes 
even more complicated by the pervasive over-exposure of financial institutions to the stock and 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Obstfeld (1986),  (1994), and (1996).   4
real estate markets, which makes banks even more vulnerable when asset bubbles burst as the 
recession approaches.  The deterioration of the current account, in turn, makes investors worried 
about the possibility of default on foreign loans.  In turn, the fragile banking sector makes the 
task of defending the peg more difficult and may lead to the eventual collapse of the domestic 
currency.  In a similar vein, Goldfajn and Valdés (1995) show how changes in international 
interest rates and capital inflows are amplified by the intermediation role of banks and how such 
swings may also produce an exaggerated business cycle that ends in bank runs and financial and 
currency crashes. 
 More recently, the literature on capital inflows and capital inflow problems has 
suggested another potential source of instability (see, for example, Calvo, 1998, Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2000, and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2002), that of liquidity crises due to sudden 
reversals in capital flows.  For example, the debt crisis in 1982, the Mexican crisis in 1994 and 
the so-called Tequila effect, and the Asian crisis in 1997-1998 show that capital inflows can 
come to a sudden stop and even can sharply reverse their course and become capital outflows.  
As emphasized by those authors, the sudden reversal, prompted, in large part, by fluctuations in 
interest rates in industrialized countries, is far more persistent and severe when the borrowing 
country is an emerging economy, highly indebted, dollarized, and with debt concentrated at 
short-maturities.  In these cases, sudden stops trigger massive depreciations of the domestic 
currency. 
The now revitalized literature on sovereign default has been mostly concerned with the 
ability or the willingness of a country to service the debt.  This literature mostly developed in the 
1980s following the debt crisis in 1982.  In a seminal contribution, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 
argue that sovereign lending can take place even if borrowers are immune to any direct actions 
by creditors in the event of no repayment.  In this approach, borrowers will not be tempted to 
default if they are concerned that they will lose their reputation in international credit markets 
and lose future access to borrowing.  In contrast, Cohen  and Sachs (1982) assume that if a 
country fails to make repayments, it will suffer a loss that is proportional to the country’s output, 
perhaps because creditors can enforce repayment through direct punishments such as disturbing 
the international trade of any borrower that unilaterally defaults.  The literature on sovereign 
crises has continued to grow, with the empirical research emphasizing that defaults are more   5
likely if the level of debt and the interest rates at which the countries borrow are high or if there 
are adverse output shocks, such as deterioration in the country’s terms of trade.   
 
III. Capturing Varieties: Methodology 
 
The empirical research on predicting currency crises has adopted a variety of econometric 
techniques. Parametric techniques include probit and VAR models.  Non-parametric techniques 
are mostly confined to the leading-indicator methodology.   While currency crises can take many 
forms, all the estimations impose “the one size fits all” approach, with the indicators predicting 
crises including indicators related to sovereign defaults, such as high foreign debt levels, or 
indicators related to fiscal crises, such as government deficits, or even indicators related to crises 
of excesses, such as stock and real estate market booms and busts.  That is, in all cases, 
researchers impose the same functional form to all observations.  When some indicators are not 
robustly linked to all crises, they tend to be discarded even when they may be of key importance 
for a subgroup of observations.  For example, as examined in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), 
financial market booms and busts are an important trigger of crises after financial liberalization 
but the deterioration of the current account is at the core of crises before financial liberalization. 
Naturally, if these non-linearities are known, they can be controlled using interactive terms. Yet, 
such knowledge is the exception rather than the rule.   
Another source of non-linearities impossible to capture in a standard regression 
framework or signals approach is that crises become more likely as the number of fragilities 
increases.  For example, a real exchange appreciation of a certain magnitude becomes more 
worrisome if coupled with excessive monetary expansion.  Similarly, high foreign debt leads to a 
further deterioration of the economy if accompanied by high world real interest rates.   
In this paper, I will use a different methodology to allow for ex-ante unknown non-
linearities.  This methodology is a modification of the conventional leading-indicator 
methodology, which  has a long history in the rich literature that evaluates the ability of 
macroeconomic and financial time series to predict business cycle turning points (see, for 
instance, Stock and Watson, 1989, and Diebold and Rudebusch, 1989). More recently, this 
technique has also been applied to predict crises.  The basic idea in the leading-indicator 
methodology is that the economy evolves through phases of booms and recessions or, in our   6
case, of tranquil times and crisis episodes and that some fundamentals start to behave differently 
at the onset of a recession or a crisis and thus can be used to predict the change in regime.  This 
change in behavior of a particular series is captured empirically by finding a “threshold” that 
turns a fluctuation of a given variable into a signal of an upcoming recession or crisis.  In most of 
the applications, this threshold is the one that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio of the particular 
indicator.  In this methodology, the working assumption is that recessions or crises are just of 
one type.
4  Moreover, thresholds are obtained indicator by indicator without consideration of 
possible complementarities.  In contrast, the proposed new methodology  allows the data to 
determine the number and characteristics of classes of crises.
5   Also, the thresholds that turn a 
fluctuation of a variable into a signal of an upcoming crisis will be identified jointly for all 
indicators to allow for interdependence.  
To identify the possible multiple varieties of crises, I apply regression tree analysis.
6   
This technique
7 allows one to search for an unknown number of sample splits (in our case, 
varieties of crises and of tranquil times) using multiple indicators.  Breiman et al (1984) show 
that the regression tree method is consistent in the sense that, under suitable regularity 
conditions, the estimated piecewise linear regression function converges to the best nonlinear 
predictor of the dependent variable of interest.  The actual sorting algorithm is described in 
Durlauf and Johnson (1995).   Intuitively, this methodology behaves as a multiple-regime signal-
approach.
8   To identify the types of crises, the observations are first divided into those 
observations in periods of crises and observations of tranquil times.
9  Crisis times are identified 
with a 1 while tranquil times are identified with a 0.  As in the conventional signal approach, the 
algorithm first chooses thresholds for each indicator to minimize its noise-to-signal ratio.
10  
                                                 
4 Also, booms or “tranquil times” are assumed to be of just one type. 
5 This methodology can be thought of as the non-parametric alternative to the multiple-regime Markov-process 
models pioneered by Hamilton (1989).  However, in contrast to the multiple-regime Markov-process model, the 
number of regimes does not need to be specified exogenously, it can be determined endogenously. 
6 See Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Ghosh and Wolf (1998) for applications of the regression tree analysis to 
characterize multiple regimes in growth behavior. 
7 See Breiman et al (1984) for a description of this technique. 
8 See, Kaminsky (1998) for a discussion of the one-regime signal-approach. 
9 Observations are catalogued into crisis times and tranquil times using an index of exchange market pressure.   See 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for a detailed explanation on the identification of crises. 
10 The selection of the appropriate threshold that turns the fluctuation in an economic time series into a signal of an 
upcoming crisis tries to fulfill conflicting criteria.  If the threshold is too “lax,” that is, “too close” to normal 
behavior, it is likely to catch all the crises but it is also likely to catch a lot of crises that never happened, that is, 
send a lot of false signals.  Alternatively, if the threshold is too “tight” it is likely to miss all but the most severe of 
crises –the price of reducing the number of false signals will be reflected in a lower proportion of crises accurately   7
Then, the indicator with the lowest noise-to-signal ratio is selected.  All observations are then 
separated into two groups: those for which the chosen indicator is signaling and those for which 
the indicator is not signaling.  For each group, the methodology is repeated.  Again, for each of 
the remaining indicators, new thresholds are selected to minimize the noise-to-signal ratio.  Note 
that this time the threshold that converts a fluctuation of an indicator into a signal of an 
upcoming crisis is conditioned on the selection of the first indicator and its threshold.  This 
allows to find complementarities: even minor fiscal problems can add to fragility and trigger 
crises if accompanied by vulnerability of the banking sector.  In this second round, groups are 
created based in the classification of the indicator with the lowest noise-to-signal ratio from all 
remaining indicators.
11  This process continues, with each new round helping to classify 
observations into more tightly defined groups.   Obviously, this process can continue until each 
observation is classified into a different type.  To avoid the perfect fit, the regression tree 
analysis imposes a penalty on the number of varieties.  As explained in Gosh and Wolf (1998), 
the rule used resembles an adjusted  R
2 criterion, with the improvement due to the identification 
of a new variety being compared with a penalty on the number of varieties.  If the penalty 
exceeds the improvement, the algorithm chooses the previous number of varieties, otherwise the 
algorithm continues to partition the sample.  Still, no asymptotic theory exists to test the 
statistical significance of the number of regimes uncovered by the regression tree.  Finally, it 
should be noted that the algorithm classifies both crisis episodes and tranquil times.   
  
IV. The Anatomy of Currency Crises 
 
The regression-tree methodology was applied to the data and the results of this exercise 
are described below.  First, the data and the estimated classification are presented.  Afterwards, 
the discussion is organized so as to answer the following questions: What are the varieties of 
financial crises that we observe in this sample of over 90 crises; and Do these fit a certain mold?  
                                                                                                                                                             
called.  The first step of the multiple-regime signal approach, as the first step of the one-regime signal-approach, 
selects the  “optimal” threshold on an indicator-by-indicator basis by performing a search over all possible 
thresholds and selecting the value that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio of each indicator. 
11 Each indicator can be used several times (with different thresholds) to partition the observations.  For example, a 
40-percent real appreciation by itself can signal a future crisis.  Still, a 10-percent real appreciation can signal a 
crisis if accompanied by excessive international borrowing.     8
Are crises in mature and emerging markets of the same variety? How severe are the 
consequences of each type of crisis?  
 
1. The Data 
 
Following the literature on early warnings, this paper will classify currency crises using 
information on a variety of indicators.  These indicators are described in Table 1.  Indicators are 
grouped according to the symptoms on which the various generation models focus on.  The first- 
generation models of currency crises highlight the inconsistency of expansionary 
macroeconomic policies with the stability of a fixed exchange rate regime.  Fiscal deficits and 
easy monetary policy are at the core of these models.  I capture the spirit of these models with 
two indicators: fiscal deficit/GDP and excess M1 real balances.
12  The second-generation models 
focus on countercyclical government policies.  The essence of these models is centered on 
problems in the current account, with real appreciations fueling losses in competitiveness and 
recessions.  I capture the focus of these models with five indicators: Exports, imports, real 
exchange rate (deviations from equilibrium
13), terms of trade, output, and real interest rates.  The 
third-generation models focus on financial excesses.  To capture the spirit of these models, I use 
six indicators: domestic credit/GDP ratio, M2/reserves, deposits, M2 multiplier, stock prices, and 
an index of banking crises.  The literature on sovereign crises has focused mainly on too much 
debt and even debt concentrated at short maturities.  To examine this variety of crises, I use two 
indicators: Foreign debt/exports, and short-term debt/foreign exchange reserves.  Finally, the 
sudden-stop approach focuses on international capital flow reversals, which I will try to capture 
with fluctuations in both the world real interest rate and foreign exchange reserves of central 
banks.  There are a total of eighteen indicators.  The Appendix describes the data in detail.   
To examine the characteristics of crises, the paper looks at a total of twenty countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
                                                 
12 Excess real money balances are the residuals from a money demand equation.  Money demand is estimated as a 
linear function of output and expected inflation.   
13 Not all real appreciations are a signal of losses in competitiveness, with for example, improvements in 
productivity in the traded-good sector triggering appreciations in the equilibrium real exchange rate.  “Equilibrium” 
movements of the real exchange rate are captured with a time trend.  See, also Goldfajn and Valdez  (1996) for a 
comparison of the ability of various methodologies in capturing equilibrium fluctuations of the real exchange rate.      9
As it is conventional in the crisis literature, crisis months are those months with a large exchange 
rate pressure index.
14  The dates of the crises for the twenty countries are reported in Table 2.   
Ninety-six crises were identified.  I should note that when classifying crises, I do not classify just 
the month of the crisis.  The build-up of fragilities preceding a crisis starts early on.  Thus, as in 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), I define “crisis episodes” as the month of the crisis plus the 
twenty-four months preceding the crisis.  Thus, in the sample, there are 2400 observations of 
crisis episodes and 5280 observations of tranquil times.
15 
 
2. The Classification 
 
To estimate the types of crisis episodes, the data on all indicators for each country are 
first transformed into percentiles of the distribution.  This transformation allows for idiosyncratic   
factors since, for example, a monthly 20-percent fall in stock prices can be business as usual in 
emerging markets but is a strong signal of crisis in a mature economy.   
The results of the regression tree are shown in Figure 1.  The hexagons show the various 
criteria for dividing the sample while the squares are the final groups of observations.  The tree 
algorithm classifies all observations into eighteen final groups or nodes.  Only nine indicators are 
used to catalogue all observations: real exchange rates, exports, excess real M1 balances, 
domestic credit/GDP, M2/Reserves, fiscal deficits/GDP, foreign debt/exports, short-term 
debt/reserves, and world interest rates.
16  Interestingly, the first split of the data is based on the 
                                                 
14  In the spirit of Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the index 
of currency market turbulence was constructed as a weighted average of exchange rate changes and reserve changes, 
with weights such that the two components of the index have equal conditional volatilities.  Since changes in the 
exchange rate enter with a positive weight and changes in reserves have a negative weight attached, readings of this 
index that were three standard deviations or more above the mean were cataloged as crises.  With countries in the 
sample that, at different times, experienced hyperinflation, the construction of the index had to be modified.  While a 
100-percent devaluation may be traumatic for a country with low-to-moderate inflation, a devaluation of that 
magnitude is commonplace during hyperinflations.  If a single index for the countries that had hyperinflation 
episodes were constructed, sizable devaluations and reserve losses in the more moderate inflation periods would be 
left out since the historic mean is distorted by the high-inflation episode.  To avoid this problem, the sample was 
divided according to whether inflation in the previous six months was higher than 150 percent and then constructed 
an index for each subsample.   
 
15 Since the definition of crisis episodes is ad hoc, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) check for robustness of the results.  
In particular, we also define crisis episodes as the 12-month and the 18-month window prior to crises.  We find that 
all qualitative results remain with the different definitions of crisis episodes. 
 
16 By looking at all the indicators jointly, the regression tree analysis allows to minimize the number of indicators 
needed to classify and predict crises.   For example, in these estimations, the index of economic activity is not   10
real exchange rate, indicating that real exchange rate appreciations are the most important signal 
of a forthcoming crisis, confirming the findings of previous studies (e.g. Goldfajn and Valdés, 
1996, and Frankel and Rose, 1996).  Observations with the real exchange rate at the 17.8 
percentile of the distribution or lower have a 74.3-percent probability of crises.  In contrast, a 
more depreciated real exchange rate signals crises with just a 25.7-percent probability.   For 
those observations with an appreciated real exchange rate, the groups are further defined with 
classifications based on domestic credit/GDP, fiscal deficit/GDP, world interest rates, foreign 
debt/exports, short-term debt/reserves, and excess M1 real balances.  In particular, some 
observations are identified by real appreciations, high domestic credit/GDP, high fiscal 
deficit/GDP, and high excess M1 real balances.  Those observations are associated with an 82-
percent probability of crises.   For those observations with no problems of real appreciation 
(observations with real exchange rates higher than the 17.8 percentile), the groups are further 
defined with classifications based on the level of world interest rates, fiscal deficits/GDP, and 
M2/Reserves ratio.  In particular, one variety of crises identified in this branch is the one studied 
by the first-generation models.  The observations in this group are characterized by fiscal 
deficits/GDP in the 3.7 percentile or lower and are associated with an 87-percent probability of 
crises.
17 
Table 3 describes in detail the characteristics of the final groups.  The indicators signaling 
vulnerability are shown in bold.  For example, the first node is characterized by a real 
appreciation of the domestic currency (real exchange rate in the 17.8-percentile or lower), low 
debt/exports ratio (debt/exports in the 71.5-percentile or lower), low short-term debt/reserves 
(short-term debt/reserves in the 16.6-percentile or lower), and low world interest rates (world 
interest rates in the 84.5-percentile or lower).  Thus, the only observed vulnerability in this group 
is the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which is shown in bold characters.   
Some of these groups share similar traits.  For example, the vulnerabilities in groups 1 
and 2 are only related to the real appreciation of the domestic currency while the vulnerabilities 
of groups 14 and 15 are both associated with hikes in world interest rates.  To account for these 
similarities, I combine the eighteen groups into six varieties of crises.  Ten of those groups are 
                                                                                                                                                             
selected as a separate indicator.  Economic activity seems to be well captured by some of the chosen indicators, such 
as the real exchange rate, domestic credit, and fiscal policy.   
17 Since fiscal deficits are represented with negative numbers, large fiscal deficits are located in the left tail of the 
distribution.     11
characterized by episodes of real appreciation.  For four of them, real appreciations reflect the 
only shown vulnerability.  I catalogue these groups as Crises with Current Account Problems.
18   
For the other six, the real appreciation is not necessarily the main determinant of crises, it just 
contributes to the build up of economic f ragilities.   When the fragilities are associated with 
booms in financial markets, crises are catalogued as  Crises of Financial Excesses.
19   In 
particular, they are identified as crises that are preceded by the acceleration in the growth rate of 
domestic credit and other monetary aggregates.   In turn, when the fragilities are associated with 
“unsustainable” foreign debt, crises are classified as Crises of Sovereign Debt Problems.  The 
fourth variety of crisis is related to expansionary fiscal policy.  These crises are labeled Crises 
with Fiscal Deficits.
20   Sudden-Stop Crises constitute the fifth variety of crisis.  This type of 
crisis is associated with reversals in capital flows triggered by hikes in world interest rates.
21   
Finally, Self-fulfilling Crises are those associated with node 13, which does not exhibit any 
evident vulnerability.   The last column of Table 3 shows the associated probabilities of crises of 
each node. 
 
3. Varieties of Crises in Emerging and Mature Economies 
 
Table 4 shows the classification of the ninety-six crises in the sample into the six 
varieties on a crisis-by-crisis basis.
22  To classify crises, I look at the episodes of crises (the 
month of the crisis and the twenty-four preceding months) and using Table 3, I tally the number 
of months in that particular episode with vulnerabilities arising from the current account, 
financial excesses, fiscal deficits, debt problems, or sudden stops.  The last column shows the 
classification for the each crisis episode.  If all the twenty-five observations in a crisis episode 
are classified in outcome 13, which shows an economy without vulnerabilities, that episode is 
                                                 
18 These crises can also be associated with the second-generation models of currency crises.   
19 See also, Gourinchas, Landerretche, and Valdés (2002) and Schneider and Tornell (2003) for an analysis of the 
relationship between booms and busts in credit markets and crises.   
20 These crises can also be associated with the first-generation models of currency crises. 
21 Guillermo Calvo (1998) introduced the concept of sudden stops in the crisis literature.  Sudden stops in this 
interpretation are associated with a reversal of international capital flows.  But hikes in world interest rates or 
changes in international investors’ sentiments are not the only defining characteristic of sudden stop crises.  These 
crises are also linked to vulnerabilities in borrower countries, which include high levels of debt, dollarization, and 
debt concentrated at very short maturities.  In our classification, sudden stop crises are just associated to one type of 
vulnerability: severe hikes in world interest rates.   
22 For three of these crises, there is no data available on the various indicators.  So, only ninety-three crises are 
classified.   12
classified as a self-fulfilling crisis.   Otherwise, as a general rule, a crisis is classified as type j if 
the majority of the months of the crisis episode are classified in variety j.  So, for example, as 
shown in Table 4, the collapse of the Turkish Lira in February 2001 is classified as a crisis of 
financial excesses because there are twenty-two months classified in outcomes 8 and 10.
23   
This classification indicates that 14 percent of the crises are related to current account 
problems, 29 percent are crises of financial excesses, 5 percent are crises with fiscal problems, 
42 percent are crises of sovereign debt problems, 5 percent of the crises are related to sudden 
stops, and just 4 percent of the crises are self-fulfilling crises.   
Table 5 shows the varieties of crises in emerging and mature economies.
24   As shown in 
this table, crises in emerging markets tend to be of a different variety than those in mature 
markets.  For example, current account and competitiveness problems are more of a trait of 
mature markets (17 percent of the crises) than of emerging economies (13 percent of the crises).  
While it is true that losses of  competitiveness also affect emerging economies, lack of 
competitiveness is just one of the many vulnerabilities that these economies suffer.  More often 
than not, lack of competitiveness is accompanied by highly expansionary credit growth and loose 
monetary policy or debt problems or even macro-policies inconsistent with the stability of the 
peg.  Overall, eighty-six percent of the crises in emerging economies are crises with multiple 
domestic vulnerabilities while economic fragility only characterizes 50 percent of the crises in 
mature markets.
25  Sudden-stop problems are also more common in mature markets (17 percent 
                                                 
23 There are three exceptions to the general rule.  First, a number of crisis episodes includes some observations 
classified as observations with current account problems and some other observations classified as observations with 
financial excesses.  Since crises of financial excesses are characterized by excessive expansion of credit/monetary 
aggregates as well as by real appreciations as in the case of crises with current account problems, I classify those 
crisis episodes as episodes with financial excesses to show the presence of multiple vulnerabilities.  For example, 
current account problems and financial excesses were widespread during the Mexican crisis of December 1994, with 
14 months showing current account problems and nine months showing “financial excesses.”   The 1994 Mexican 
crisis is classified as a crisis of financial excesses even though the number of months with current-account problems 
exceeds that with financial excesses.  Second, some crisis episodes include observations with debt problems and 
fiscal problems.  Since fiscal problems are part and parcel of debt problems, those crisis-episodes are classified as 
crises with debt problems.  Third, some crisis episodes include observations with financial excesses and 
observations with debt problems.  Again, as debt problems are part and parcel of financial excesses, those episodes 
are classified as crises of financial excesses.  A final note, when observations are classified into various groups, the 
only groups that are considered for the classification of the crisis episode are those that include at least six 
observations.  Since this is an ad-hoc criterion, robustness tests have been performed.  Qualitative results are not 
affected.  The results are available upon request. 
24 Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden are the mature economies in the sample.  The remaining countries 
in the sample are considered emerging economies.  
25 The crises associated with multiple vulnerabilities are Crises of Financial Excesses, Crises of Fiscal Deficits, and 
Crises of Sovereign Debt problems.   13
of all crises) than in emerging markets (2 percent of all crises).  Again, in our classification, 
sudden-stop problems are just characterized by adverse shocks to international capital markets 
and crises in emerging economies mostly occur in the midst of multiple vulnerabilities.  Finally, 
while most of the crises are preceded by real, financial, or external fragilities, a small number of 
crises are unrelated to deteriorating fundamentals (Self-fulfilling crises).  These crises are not a 
feature of emerging markets but tend to occur in mature markets.
26 
Table 6 evaluates the costs of the different varieties of crises.  Costs are grouped into 
three categories.  The first one captures the magnitude of the speculative attack.  Two indicators 
are used:  losses of reserves and real exchange rate depreciations.  For reserves, I use the six-
month percentage change prior to the month of the crisis, as losses of reserves tend to occur 
before the devaluation occurs (if the speculative attack is successful).  For the real exchange rate 
depreciation, I use the six-month percentage real depreciation following the month of the crisis 
since large devaluations tend to occur only after and if the central bank concedes by devaluing or 
floating the currency.  The second category focuses on output losses (relative to trend) in the 
year of the crisis and one year after the crisis so as to examine not only the magnitude of the 
collapse following the crisis but also the persistence of output losses.  The third category looks at 
access to international capital markets in the aftermath of the crisis.  It focuses on the behavior of 
the trade account in the year following the crisis.  The table reports separately the 12-month 
percentage change (relative to trend) in exports and imports following the month of the crisis.   
The first six columns report the average for each variety of crises.  The last column shows the 
average across all crises.   
As shown in Table 6, reserve losses oscillate around 14 percent for all crises with the 
exception of those classified as self-fulfilling, for which reserves increase about 15 percent in the 
months preceding the crises.  The depreciation of the real exchange rate across type of crises is 
more varied and oscillates between 1 and 31 percent.  Depreciations are most extreme in the case 
of crises of financial excesses.  As is the case with real depreciations, output losses (relative to 
trend) are also substantially larger in the aftermath of crises of financial excesses.  In this case, 
                                                 
26 While in the theoretical literature self-fulfilling crises are associated with the EMS crises in 1992 and 1993, the 
implied classification from the regression tree identifies those episodes as crises with domestic vulnerabilities.  In 
the case of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, vulnerabilities are associated with international borrowing and 
debt problems, while in the case of Spain, fragilities are related to financial excesses.    The regression tree only 
classifies as self-fulfilling crises, or crises with immaculate fundamentals, the crises associated with the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods System.   14
output losses increase to almost 4 percent.  In contrast, output (relative to trend) is unchanged or 
continues to grow in the aftermath of crises with no observed domestic fragility, both those of 
the sudden-stop and the self-fulfilling varieties.  Output losses are somewhat persistent.  On 
average, during the second year after the crisis, output continues to fall relative to trend.  Again, 
declines in economic activity are less pronounced in the aftermath of crises with no domestic 
fragility.   
Finally, Table 6 also shows that, as discussed in Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000), access to international capital markets can be severely impaired in the aftermath of 
crises, with countries having to run sizable current account surpluses to repay their debt.  The 
size and type of the adjustment varies across types of crises.  For example, in the case of crises 
with financial excesses, most of the adjustment occurs on the import side, with imports falling –
relative to trend– approximately 25 percent.  In contrast, exports fail to grow (deviations from 
trend growth are almost zero) even though the depreciations during this type of crises are 
massive.  This evidence suggests that countries are even unable to attract trade credits to finance 
exports when their economies are mired in financial problems.
27  In contrast, for crises with no 
domestic fragilities, booming exports are at the heart of the recovery of the current account.  
Summarizing, on average, the costs of crises with financial excesses are significantly higher than 
those of other crises, with crises of debt problems being a close second.  On the opposite end, 
self-fulfilling crises or crises triggered by just  reversal in capital flows have no noticeable 
adverse effects on the economy.    
 
V. The Early Warnings 
 
Figure 2 reports the time-series probabilities of currency crises implicit in the estimation 
for all countries in the sample for the period January 1970- December 2001.  The shaded areas in 
the figures are “crisis times.”  Overall, there are 2400 observations of crises (31 percent) and 
5280 observations of “tranquil times” (69 percent).  Macroeconomic vulnerabilities are basically 
not present during “tranquil times,” with 77 percent of the observations being classified under 
                                                 
27 See, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) for a chronology of the Asian crisis in 1997-1998 with an emphasis on 
financial overlending before the crisis and the liquidity crunch following the devaluations.   See, also, Mishkin 
(1996) for an analysis of overlending cycles in emerging markets.    15
outcome 13.  For those observations, the probability of crises is just 13.5 percent.  This is the 
frequency of crises in times of immaculate fundamentals.   
In most cases, vulnerabilities are highly persistent and they trigger repeated exchange rate 
crises.  For example, Colombia suffered a series of crises in the late 1990s.  Similarly, the July-
1997 crisis in Thailand that set the onset of the Asian crisis was followed by a string of crises 
that only ended in July 2000.  Episodes of multiple crises can be of the same nature.  This was 
the case of Argentina in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, with debt problems at the 
heart of all speculative attacks.  In contrast, the nature of the crises in Thailand evolved from 
problems of excessive borrowing at the beginning of the episode to fiscal problems following the 
bailout of the banking sector. 
This section evaluates the forecasting accuracy of the multiple-regime signals approach 
vis-à-vis the traditional signals approach (Kaminsky, 1998).  I follow Diebold and Rudebusch 
(1989) in evaluating both techniques.  Two tests are implemented to evaluate the average 
closeness of the predicted probabilities and observed realizations, as measured by a zero-one 
dummy variable.  Suppose we have T probability forecasts: 
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The QPS ranges from 0 to 2, with a score of 0 corresponding to perfect accuracy. 
The second scoring-rule is the log probability score (LPS), given by  
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The LPS ranges from 0 to  ¥ , with a score of 0 corresponding to perfect accuracy.  The loss 
function associated with LPS differs from that corresponding to QPS, as large mistakes are 
penalized more heavily under LPS. 
Table 7 shows both the Quadratic Probability Score (QPS) and the log Probability Score 
(LPS) for the forecasting probabilities of the two indicators.  The score statistics are reported 
separately for the whole sample, “Crisis Times” and “Tranquil Times.”  As shown in this table, 
the multiple-regime signals approach makes a substantial improvement over the traditional 
signals approach.   This holds regardless of the loss function used.  For the whole sample, the 
losses in forecasting accuracy from using the one-regime signals approach reach 26 percent.  
Losses in predictive accuracy from using the one-regime signals approach even reach 47 percent 
during tranquil times, indicating that the multiple-regime signals approach issues substantially 




Currency crises are not a new phenomenon.  Not only is the list of countries affected by 
these crises long but it is also increasing.  Many have emphasized the destructive forces of 
currency crises, and the economics profession as a whole is crusading to find ways of avoiding 
crises.  But while some countries collapse following a crisis, many others that also fall prey to 
speculative attacks do not suffer catastrophic consequences, suggesting that crises come in many 
varieties.  Yet, most previous empirical studies of crises have failed to allow for this diversity. 
In this paper, I used regression tree methods to classify ninety-six crises in twenty 
countries from 1970 to 2001.  The results indicate that crises are not created equal, with the 
empirical classification reflecting the varieties proposed by the various generations of models of 
currency crises.  Still, some models are better than others at capturing the stylized characteristics 
of crises. For example, I find that most of the crises are characterized by  multitude of weak 
economic fundamentals, suggesting that it would be difficult to characterize them as “self-
fulfilling” crises.   
Finally, since crises are of different varieties, early-warning systems should allow for 
multiple regimes.  Thus, the second-generation early-warning systems should incorporate   17
methodologies such as regression tree analysis or parametric multiple-regime models à la 
Hamilton (1989) to capture a broad spectrum of crises.   
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Data Appendix 
The Indicators: Sources and Definitions 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund (IMF); Emerging Market Indicators, 
International Finance Corporation (IFC);  World Development Indicators, The World Bank (WB); The Maturity, 
Sectoral, and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, Bank for International Settlements (BIS); 
International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Bank for International Settlements. When data was 
missing from these sources, central bank bulletins and other country-specific sources were used as supplements. 
Unless otherwise noted, all variables are in 12-month percent changes. 
1. M2 multiplier: The ratio of M2 (IFS lines 34 plus 35) to base money (IFS line 14). 
2. Domestic Credit/GDP: IFS line 52 divided by IFS line 64 to obtain domestic credit in real terms, which was then 
divided by IFS line 99b.p. (interpolated) to obtain the domestic credit/GDP ratio. Monthly real GDP was 
interpolated from annual data. 
3. Domestic Real Interest Rate: Deposit rate (IFS line 60) deflated using consumer prices (IFS line 64). Monthly 
rates expressed in percentage points. In levels. 
4. "Excess" Ml balances: Ml (IFS line 34) deflated by consumer prices (IFS line 64) less an estimated demand for 
money. The demand for real balances is determined by real GDP (interpolated IFS line 99b.p), domestic consumer 
price inflation, and a time trend. Domestic inflation was used in lieu of nominal interest rates, as market-determined 
interest rates were not available during the entire sample for a number of countries; the time trend is motivated by its 
role as a proxy for financial innovation and/or currency substitution. In levels. 
5. M2/Reserves: IFS lines 34 plus 35 converted into dollars (using IFS line ae) divided by IFS line IL.d. 
6. Bank Deposits: IFS line 24 plus 25 deflated by consumer prices (IFS line 64). 
7. Exports: IFS line 70. 
8. Imports: IFS line 71. 
9. Terms of Trade: The unit value of exports (IFS line 74) over the unit value of imports (IFS line 75). For those 
developing countries where import unit values (or import price indices) were not available, an index of prices of 
manufactured exports from industrial countries to developing countries was used. 
10. The Real Exchange Rate: The real exchange rate index is derived from a nominal exchange rate index, 
adjusted for relative consumer prices (IFS line 64). The measure is defined as the relative price of foreign goods (in 
domestic currency) to the price of domestic goods. The nominal exchange rate index is a weighted average of the 
exchange rates of the nineteen OECD countries with weights equal to the country trade shares with the OECD 
countries. Since not all real appreciations reflect disequilibirium phenomena, we focus on deviations of the real 
exchange rate from trend.  In levels. 
11. Reserves: IFS line IL.d. 
12. Output: For most countries, the measure of output used is industrial production (IFS line 66). However, for 
some countries, (the commodity exporters) an index of output of primary commodities is used (IFS lines 66aa), if 
industrial production is not available. 
13. Stock returns: IFC global indices are used for all emerging markets: for industrial countries the quotes from the 
main boards are used. All stock prices are in US dollars. 
14. Short-term Foreign Debt: Liabilities of domestic residents to BIS reporting banks with maturities up to one 
year divided by total liabilities of domestic residents to BIS reporting banks, interpolated from semi-annual data. 
The Maturity, Sectoral, and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, Bank for International 
Settlements. 
15. Foreign Debt: Liabilities of domestic residents to BIS reporting banks. International Banking and Financial 
Market Developments (BIS). 
16. World Real Interest Rate: US deposit rate (IFS line 60) deflated using consumer prices (IFS line 64). Monthly 
rates expressed in percentage points. In levels. 
17. Fiscal Deficit: The ratio of fiscal deficit (IFS line 80) deflated by consumer prices (IFS line 64) to GDP (IFS 
line 99b.p) interpolated. 
18. Banking Crises: Index of banking crises from Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) (updated to 2002).   
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Table 1
Indicators of Currency CrisesCountry Currency Crisis Country Currency Crisis
Argentina June 1970 Malaysia July 1975
June 1975 August 1997
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Table 2
Chronology of Currency CrisesOutcomes Characteristics  Current  Financial  Fiscal Sovereign Sudden Self- Probability
Account Excesses Deficit Debt Stops Fulfilling
real appreciation < 0.178
1 low Domestic Credit/GDP growth < 0.715 * 66.3
low Short Debt/Reserves < 0.166
low world interest rate i* < .329
real appreciation < 0.178
2 low Domestic Credit/GDP growth < 0.715 * 6.3
low Short Debt/Reserves < 0.166
0.329 < moderate world interest rate < 0.845
real appreciation < 0.178
3 low Domestic Credit/GDP growth < 0.715 * 93.2
low Short Debt/Reserves < 0.166
high world interest rate > 0.845
extreme real appreciation < 0.039
4 low Domestic Credit/GDP growth < 0.715 * 62.8
moderate Short Debt/Reserves > 0.166
low Debt/Exports < 0.689
0.039 < real appreciation < 0.178
5 low Domestic Credit/GDP growth < 0.715 * 30.1
moderate Short Debt/Reserves > 0.166
low Debt/Exports < 0.689
real appreciation < 0.178
low Domestic Credit/GDP growth < 0.715
6 moderate Short Debt/Reserves > 0.166 * 72.8
high Debt/Exports > 0.689
Deteriorating Exports < 0.457
real appreciation < 0.178
low Domestic Credit/GDP growth < 0.715
7 moderate Short Debt/Reserves > 0.166 * 35.9
high Debt/Exports > 0.689
Growing Exports > 0.457
real appreciation < 0.178
8 high Domestic Credit/GDP growth > 0.715 * 87.4
high fiscal deficit < 0.486
real appreciation < 0.178
9 high Domestic Credit/GDP growth > 0.715 * 13
low fiscal deficit > 0.486
contractionary monetary policy < 0.888
real appreciation < 0.178
10 high Domestic Credit/GDP growth > 0.715 * 82.9
low fiscal deficit > 0.486
expansionary monetary policy > 0.888
real depreciation > 0.178
11 low Debt/Exports  < 0.755 87
low world interest rate i* < .535 *
extremely high fiscal deficit < 0.037
real depreciation > 0.178
12 low Debt/Exports < 0.755 * 14.3
0.535 < moderate world interest rate I* < 0.934
extremely high fiscal deficit < 0.037
real depreciation > 0.178
13 low Debt/Exports < 0.755 * 13.5
low world interest rate i* < 0.934
no extremely high fiscal deficit > 0.037
0.178 < moderate real appreciation < 0.672
14 low Debt/Exports < 0.755 * 56
extremely high world interest rate i* > 0.934
real depreciation > 0.672
15 low Debt/Exports < 0.755 * 9.2
extremely high world interest rate i* > 0.934
real depreciation > 0.178
16 high Debt/Exports > 0.755 * 34.9
moderate fiscal deficit < 0.572
low M2/Reserves < 0.778
real depreciation > 0.178
17 high Debt/Exports > 0.755 * 68.7
moderate fiscal deficit < 0.572
high M2/Reserves > 0.778
real depreciation > 0.178
18 high Debt/Exports > 0.755 * 19.6
moderate fiscal deficit < 0.572
Notes: The * indicates to which variety of crises each group belongs. 
Table 3
Varieties of Currency CrisesCountry Crisis Financial Sudden Variety 
Excesses Stops
Jun-70 - - - - - n.a.
Jun-75 6 15 0 2 0 Financial Excesses
Feb-81 1 11 0 0 0 Financial Excesses
Jul-82 4 7 0 2 11 Financial Excesses
Argentina Sep-86 0 0 0 21 0 Sovereign Debt
Apr-89 0 0 0 23 0 Sovereign Debt
Feb-90 0 0 0 19 0 Sovereign Debt
Jan-02 7 3 0 0 0 Current Account
Nov-82 5 8 0 3 8 Financial Excesses
Bolivia Nov-83 4 8 0 4 4 Financial Excesses
Sep-85 2 0 0 4 18 Sudden Stops
Feb-83 0 0 0 11 11 Sovereign Debt
Nov-86 0 0 0 24 0 Sovereign Debt
Brazil Jul-89 0 0 0 8 0 Sovereign Debt
Nov-90 0 0 4 7 0 Sovereign Debt
Oct-91 0 0 1 3 0 Sovereign Debt
Jan-99 11 12 0 2 0 Financial Excesses
Dec-71 0 0 0 5 0 Sovereign Debt
Aug-72 0 0 6 7 0 Sovereign Debt
Oct-73 8 0 10 3 0 Fiscal Deficits
Chile Dec-74 8 0 2 0 0 Current Account
Jan-76 0 0 0 7 0 Sovereign Debt
Aug-82 0 0 0 7 9 Sovereign Debt
Sep-84 0 0 0 24 0 Sovereign Debt
Mar-83 1 12 0 10 1 Financial Excesses
Feb-85 0 6 0 16 0 Financial Excesses
Colombia Aug-95 0 1 0 0 0 Financial Excesses
Sep-97 11 2 0 2 0 Current Account
Sep-98 9 12 0 3 0 Financial Excesses
Aug-99 3 16 1 5 0 Financial Excesses
May-71 0 0 0 0 0 Self-Fulfilling
Denmark Jun-73 0 0 0 0 0 Self-Fulfilling
Nov-79 19 0 0 0 0 Current Account
Aug-93 0 0 0 11 0 Sovereign Debt
Jun-73 0 0 0 0 0 Self-Fulfilling
Finland Oct-82 0 0 0 0 22 Sudden Stops
Nov-91 1 5 0 21 0 Sovereign Debt
Sep-92 0 3 0 20 0 Sovereign Debt
Nov-78 8 0 2 2 0 Current Account
Apr-83 0 15 0 0 9 Financial Excesses
Indonesia Sep-86 2 0 0 4 3 Sovereign Debt
Dec-97 0 0 0 14 0 Sovereign Debt
Jan-98 0 0 0 18 0 Sovereign Debt
Nov-74 7 5 0 1 0 Current Account
Israel Nov-77 4 13 0 0 0 Financial Excesses
Oct-83 0 0 0 23 2 Sovereign Debt
Jul-84 0 0 0 25 0 Sovereign Debt
Jul-75 12 5 0 1 0 Current Account
Malaysia Aug-97 0 12 0 1 0 Financial Excesses
Jun-98 0 10 0 3 0 Financial Excesses
Sep-76 0 1 0 2 0 Sovereign Debt
Mexico Feb-82 4 5 0 3 3 Financial Excesses
Dec-82 4 5 0 7 5 Sovereign Debt
Dec-94 15 9 0 0 0 Financial Excesses
Jun-73 0 0 0 0 0 Self-Fulfilling
Feb-78 6 17 0 2 0 Financial Excesses
May-86 0 0 0 2 3 Sudden Stops
Norway Dec-92 0 0 12 5 0 Fiscal Deficits
Jan-98 0 0 0 2 0 Sovereign Debt
Jul-99 0 0 0 18 0 Sovereign Debt
Nov-00 0 0 0 12 0 Sovereign Debt
Jun-76 12 4 0 3 0 Current Account
Oct-87 0 0 0 23 0 Sovereign Debt
Sep-88 0 0 0 19 0 Sovereign Debt
Feb-70 - - - - - n.a.
Oct-83 1 13 0 7 2 Financial Excesses
Philippines Jun-84 0 8 0 15 0 Financial Excesses
Feb-86 0 2 0 22 0 Sovereign Debt
Dec-97 0 20 0 0 0 Sovereign Debt
Feb-76 4 1 0 0 0 Current Account
Jul-77 10 0 0 0 0 Current Account
Spain Dec-82 0 0 0 7 16 Sovereign Debt
Sep-92 12 12 0 0 0 Financial Excesses
May-93 9 7 0 1 0 Financial Excesses
Aug-77 24 0 0 0 0 Current Account
Sweden Sep-81 0 0 0 0 10 Sudden Stops
Oct-82 0 0 0 0 22 Sudden Stops
Nov-92 8 0 0 16 0 Sovereign Debt
Nov-78 4 0 0 0 0 Current Account
Jul-81 3 1 0 0 3 Current Account
Thailand Nov-84 1 23 0 1 0 Financial Excesses
Jul-97 1 2 0 20 0 Sovereign Debt
Jan-98 0 2 0 21 0 Sovereign Debt
Sep-99 0 0 8 14 0 Sovereign Debt
Jul-00 0 0 11 4 0 Fiscal Deficits
Aug-70 - - - - - n.a.
Turkey Jan-80 6 0 0 9 0 Sovereign Debt
Mar-94 2 0 0 14 0 Sovereign Debt
Feb-01 0 22 0 2 0 Financial Excesses
Dec-71 0 0 0 4 0 Sovereign Debt
Oct-82 5 16 0 8 0 Financial Excesses
Feb-84 2 6 0 4 8 Financial Excesses
Dec-86 0 0 0 20 1 Sovereign Debt
Venezuela Mar-89 0 0 0 25 0 Sovereign Debt
May-94 0 0 5 1 0 Fiscal Deficits
Dec-95 3 0 11 0 0 Fiscal Deficits












Current  Financial  Fiscal  Sovereign  Sudden  Self-
Account Excesses Deficits Debt Stops Fulfilling
Emerging 13 35 6 45 2 0
Mature 17 13 4 33 17 17
Ratio Current  Financial  Fiscal  Sovereign  Sudden  Self-
Account Excesses Deficits Debt Stops Fulfilling
E/M 0.8 2.7 1.5 1.4 0.1 0
Notes: The top panel shows the percent of crises in each variety.  For example, 35 
percent of all crises in emerging markets are classified as crises of Financial Excesses.
Table 5
Number of Crises 
Relative Importance of Crises in the Two Regions
Crises in Emerging and Mature Markets
(in percent)Indicator Current Financial Fiscal  Sovereign Sudden Self- All Crises
Account Excesses Deficits Debt Stops Fulfilling (average)
Reserve Losses -14.1 -13.0 -19.6 -12.7 -12.5 15.4 -12.1
Depreciation 15.1       30.8** 24.3 20.1 13.3    1.2* 20.1
Growth t -1.9       -3.8* -1.9 -3.4  -0.2*     0.6** -2.9
Growth t+1 -0.9 -0.7  -2.8* -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7
Imports Growth -3.9  -24.5** 7.2 -4.8 -6.0 22.4 -8.2
Exports Growth 4.3 -0.5 -7.6 0.4 5.3 19.5* 1.3
Notes: Reserve Losses are computed as the change in foreign exchange reserves of the central bank in
the six months prior to the crisis.  Depreciation is computed as the real exchange rate depreciation in the
six months after the crisis.  Growth in the aftermath of crises is computed as the changes in output  relative
to mean growth during the sample.  t and t+1 refer to the year of the crisis and the year following the crisis,
respectively.  Import (export) growth is computed as the change in imports (exports) -relative to trend- in the 
12 months following the crisis.  
*, **, *** refer to 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance values.  The null hypothesis is that the severity of the 
particular variety of crisis is equal to that of the average crisis.  The significance values refer to one-tail tests
and reflect the alternative hypothesis that the cost of a particular type of crisis is larger (smaller) than that of 
of the average crisis.
Table 6
Varieties and Costs of Crises
Costs of Crises
(in percent)Episodes
QPS LPS QPS LPS
All Sample 0.369 0.561 0.293 0.464
Crisis Times 0.937 1.249 0.779 1.069
Tranquil Times 0.161 0.308 0.109 0.235
Notes: QPS refers to the Quadratic Probability Score and LPS refers to
the Log Probability Score.  
Table 7
One Regime  Multiple Regime 











yes no yes no no yes
D/X<.689 EM1<.696 FD/Y<.037 RER<.672 M2/R<.776 i*<.845
Node 10
Node 8 Node 18
yes no
yes yes no no yes no yes no no yes
RER<.039 X<.457
Node 9 i*<.535 Node 13 Node 14 Node 15 Node 16 Node 17 Node 3
yes no yes no no yes
yes no
Node 6 Node 11 Node 12 Node 1 Node 2 Node 5 Node 7












































































































































1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile
Colombia Denmark Finland Indonesia
Israel Malaysia Mexico Norway
Peru Philippines Spain Sweden
Thailand Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
Note: Shaded Areas denote crisis windows
Probabilities of Currency Crises